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Abstract
Daniel Kahneman. Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux) 499 pp. ISBN
978-0374275631.
As an expansive review of Kahneman and others' work over the past half-century in understanding human
decision-making, Thinking, Fast and Slow provides Numeracy readers much to consider for both
pedagogy and research. In this review, we outline Kahneman's core argument—that humans use both rash
(emotional) System 1 thinking and slow (logical) System 2 thinking—then discuss how such systems
might be addressed in a quantitative literacy classroom.
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Overview
In Thinking, Fast and Slow (TFaS), Daniel Kahneman (2011)—Nobel Laureate
and one of psychology’s preeminent scholars—weaves together decades of
research that he and others completed on how humans1 make decisions under
uncertain conditions. Kahneman dedicated his book to now-deceased Amos
Tversky, a longtime friend and colleague of similar influence in the discipline,
crediting Tversky throughout the book as a key research wingman to whom his
contributions to psychology are inextricably linked. Not surprisingly, those
familiar with Kahneman and Tversky’s (1974) classic article “Judgement Under
Uncertainty”—which has just over 40,000 citations on Google Scholar at the time
of this writing—will find themselves in familiar territory in reading TFaS, given
that Kahneman’s research career revolved around related issues. Familiar
heuristics from the 1974 piece, including the representativeness, availability, and
anchoring heuristics, make appearances throughout the book, but they do not
comprise the central focus. Rather, Kahneman introduces two characters as
metaphors for how the mind works, calling them System 1 and System 2,
responsible for fast (intuitive and emotional) thinking and slow (deliberative and
logical) thinking, respectively. These characters serve as the two protagonists in
Kahneman’s exposition, which spans from his Nobel Prize-winning work on
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), to the ways in which we
remember painful or happy events.
That Kahneman calls Systems 1 and 2 characters is evocative of the book’s
colloquial style, which is aimed at a general audience rather than those anchored
to any specific discipline. As opposed to a textbook, TFaS is eminently
accessible—a hallmark first resource for readers interested in cognitive biases and
the story of the research behind their “discovery.” However, the book is
extensive, and it represents one scholar’s curation of how the mind works; this
story is Kahneman’s, and it should not be taken as a universal account on the
subject matter. Given the expansive scope of the book (the paperback version is
499 pages), this review cannot summarize the book in its entirety, making it
difficult to generalize what one might get out of the book. Every reader’s unique
disciplinary background and life experiences will inevitably influence what
insights or questions she or he takes away. Like Numbers and Nerves:
Information, Emotion, and Meaning in a World of Data (Slovic and Slovic 2015),
which was reviewed last year for Numeracy (Kelly 2017; Tunstall 2017), TFaS
leaves one with more questions than answers. In this review, we summarize the
core of Kahneman’s book, then present salient issues and themes the Numeracy
community might pick up for future teaching and research.
1

A critique one could readily make of the book is that Kahneman does not devote space to the
generalizability of the research he and others have done. Most of the research was done on U.S.
college students, yet is generalized to describe how humans, broadly speaking, make decisions.
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Two Characters and Two Species
Imagine being asked “Should recreational marijuana be legalized?” by a colleague
in the office breakroom. It is likely that you would have a gut reaction—a yes or
no in mind—in responding. This gut reaction is the character of System 1 at play,
driven effortlessly by our values and beliefs, and subject to the myriad pitfalls that
Kahneman presents throughout the book. The consideration of other factors
surrounding the issue of recreational marijuana, such as externalities, policy
specifics, and so on, would be the task of System 2 if we were inclined to
consciously engage it on the matter, perhaps discussing the issue in detail with the
colleague. A central component of Kahneman’s argument in the book is that,
more often than not, System 1 is “correct” and System 2 is not needed; however,
System 1 can be responsible for decisions that are not at all within our best
interests. For instance, if we asked several individuals the question “Is Steve more
likely to be a gambler, or a gambler with a drinking problem?” they would likely
choose the latter option—an example of System 1’s susceptibility to the
conjunction fallacy. Of course, if we were social workers interviewing Steve and
he admitted being a gambler, we would be correct in also asking if he drank
alcohol consistently. The bulk of TFaS is to describe many of the ways in which
System 1 can engender mistakes. In Table 1 below, we include a sampling of the
heuristics and biases discussed. Of course, these are not exhaustive of what
Kahneman discusses.
Table 1
Sampling of Biases and Heuristics from TFaS
Bias or heuristic
Illusion of validity,
Chapter 20

Description
The notion that an “official”
model or source of knowledge is
more valid than one which is not

Example in relation to quantitative literacy
An individual deciding where to invest money
may believe that a mutual fund from Fidelity
Investments is more profitable than a similar
fund like the S&P 500

Anchoring,
Chapter 11

We tend to make inferences or
estimates differently depending
on how the issue was initially
brought up

If a student is asked to estimate their
anticipated salary upon graduating college,
their response would be different if—for
example—the prompt was initially preceded
by a statement such as “most graduates tend to
make above-average salaries”

Loss aversion (a
hallmark element
of prospect
theory), Chapter
26

We tend to weigh potential losses
as more important than equivalent
potential gains when making
decisions

Other things equal, students are more likely to
pick a credit card with no annual fee than one
with an annual fee and benefits that make up
for the fee

Duration neglect,
Chapter 35

When recalling an experience, the
duration of the experience is not
as important as how pleasant or
unpleasant parts or the entirety of
the experience was

A student with one horrible interaction with a
professor is more likely to retrospectively
report the semester being horrible, than is a
student who had frequent mildly negative, but
unmemorable interactions with the professor
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As one might imagine, some of these biases from Table 1 could have serious
repercussions for individuals, companies, and governments, among other entities.
The implication is that it is imperative that we aim to be aware of our proneness to
mistakes. As Kahneman contemplates in his concluding remarks: “The way to
block errors that originate in System 1 is simple in principle: recognize the signs
that you are in a cognitive minefield, slow down, and ask for reinforcement from
System 2” (p. 417). This task is not easy, of course, and Kahneman is quick to
point that out, noting that it is much easier to observe others walking into
mistakes than it is to see the issues in one’s existing judgment. Such limited
foresight leads Kahneman to his critique of the traditional assumption of
economists that humans are rational agents.
To that end, in Part Four of the book (entitled “Choices”), Kahneman
broaches the salient disconnect, or paradigmatic divide, between economists and
psychologists, in that the former group tends to assume humans make decisions
that are in their best interests and internally consistent, whereas many in the latter
group—himself included—suggest that such assumptions are not true. Using the
terminology of Richard Thaler (co-author of the bestselling book, Nudge), he calls
rational humans Econs, and fallible humans Humans—two species that highlight
the disciplinary divide (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). This disconnect troubles
Kahneman to the extent that he devotes space in the text to discuss the divide and
to critique liberalism, especially as espoused by Milton Friedman and colleagues
of the Chicago School of Economics. Kahneman notes that merely describing
humans as irrational is unproductive. In one of our favorite quotes from the book,
he writes: “I often cringe when my work with Amos is credited with
demonstrating that human choices are irrational, when in fact our research only
showed that Humans are not well described by the rational-agent model” (p. 411).
Though at times Kahneman’s writing may feel like a polemic on human
reasoning—a critique we levy only because of our optimistic attitude toward
students’ thinking—it is worth noting that Kahneman does have a positive
outlook on the Humans species.

Thoughts for the Numeracy Community
Moving beyond the content of the book, there are a number of a ways in which
educators might utilize the content of TFaS in a quantitative literacy classroom.
An easy means of broaching these issues in the classroom is to discuss the biases
and heuristics directly. We can readily imagine an instructor devoting some time
each week, or during targeted lessons, to various heuristics and biases discussed
in the book, relating them to mathematical principles as appropriate. For example,
in discussing the concept of the correlation coefficient, one could bring up
Chapter 20’s notion of the Illusion of Validity in describing how mutual funds
rarely—on average at least—outperform the S&P 500 over the course of any
single year.
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An additional idea is that one could devote a week (or more) to the mathematics
of happiness, discussing existing operationalizations of the construct and how one
might quantify the notion of a happy life. This discussion could build from
Chapters 35 through 38 of Kahneman’s book, where he gives several examples of
measuring subjective constructs using basic graphs. In Figure 1, we provide an
amusing sample graph that could bring out conversation in the classroom. As
Kahneman describes in these chapters, research has shown that the way one
retrospectively describes an event is not necessarily the “logical” sum of prior
related events; that is, for example, in evaluating the enjoyment of one’s marriage,

Figure 1. Graph relating an individual’s happiness rating over time after
marrying, discussed in the text.

it is not necessarily the sum of all the times one was happy minus the times one
was unhappy. In the case of Figure 1, the individual in the graph might note that
the marriage was a complete disaster, despite the overall happiness throughout its
span over 30 years. This dynamic brings the issue of logical conclusions directly
to the fore, as there is an ostensible mismatch between human behavior and
mathematical necessity in this case and in many examples in the book. Kahneman
errs on the side of calling such mismatches on the part of humans illogical,
which—though we see where he is coming from—may be an area for debate.
Throughout the book, Kahneman makes normative claims about how humans
should behave if they were logical. Their failure to make logical choices—often a
consequence of System 1’s doing—is most often positioned as a problem. Hence
the reason for the book.
Beyond how we might work to make students cognizant of Systems 1 and 2,
we also see promise in framing aspects of a course using the insights of prospect
theory and other related work Kahneman describes. A key idea from prospect
theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) is that while humans like to win, they
prefer to avoid losses more so than achieve equivalent gains. One could readily
incorporate this dynamic into one’s syllabus or assessment. For instance, studies
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have shown that when grading scales are framed in terms of gains (0 to 100)
rather than losses (100 to 0), students show increased motivation and achievement
(Bies-Hernandez 2012). In a related manner, Smith and Smith (2009) found that
using a grading scale out of 600 points increased student motivation, confidence
and performance, and anticipated effort in class as compared to a grading scale
out of 100 points or 100 percent. This study suggests that the way an instructor
uses framing—or different ways of presenting a single idea (Tversky and
Kahneman 1981)—in a syllabus may have implications for adaptive student
outcomes. Framing may also be used as a starting point in the classroom to show
students how news articles using statistics can present stories in a positive or
negative light (i.e., gains or losses). Tversky and Kahneman (1981) discuss how
framing in this regard can lead to preference reversals.
Moving beyond the classroom or syllabus, we can think of several research
questions that Numeracy readers might be interested in. For example, to what
extent is it the responsibility of courses with a quantitative literacy designation to
account for and “correct” the heuristics and biases that Kahneman raises in TFaS?
The mathematics classroom is typically viewed as outside the purview of
judgment and decision-making, but Kahneman makes clear that our actions when
faced with quantitative information are often led by System 1, rather than System
2, and thus that we should be attuned to such biases if we are to have a chance at
correcting them. Another area ripe for exploration, as alluded to in the examples
we mentioned, is the way in which we might use framing in the classroom (and
perhaps institutionally as well). Although research suggests that framing can be
used in the classroom to elicit adaptive student outcomes, researchers may still
wish to explore this area in more detail. For example, researchers may find
interest in examining how an instructor can use framing in a syllabus in other
ways besides grading scales to evoke positive student behavior.
No doubt, there are many more questions that interested readers will likely
raise from TFaS. Indeed, we imagine that—with another read of the book—we
would take away new insights and questions. One thing that remains clear is that
Numeracy readers should read Kahneman’s expansive work. Not only is it an
essential read for those not rooted in psychology but interested in its insights, it is
at once both accessible and brimmed with historical commentary unlikely to be
found in any research article.
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